Genocide, Variations on a Theme #I

Part Eight, Benny Morris #2

Genocide, Variations on a Theme #I

Part Eight, Benny Morris #2

One Zionist, Josef Weitz, noted in his diary (on the 20th of December 1940): “It must be clear that there is no room in the country for both peoples ... If the Arabs leave it, the country will become wide and spacious for us ... There is no way but to transfer the Arabs from here to the neighbouring countries...”. In private Ben-Gurion supported the idea of transfer, writing: “We must expel Arabs and take their places”. In public he told the UN: “We do not claim that any Arab should be moved”.

Wholehearted support for the destruction of villages however was lacking. According to Benny Morris a mayor by the name of Yosef Sapir stated: “This recalls Lidice — (and) here is food for thought.”

The British might well have loudly complained about the Zionist actions, which were “an offence to civilisation”, but they did nothing to actually prevent them.

Morris, in contrast to Pappé, is more indulgent toward the Zionists, who he sees as adopting at first a defensive and only later an offensive posture, if only because they were worried about antagonising the British occupiers.

According to Morris the Zionists were by no means as disciplined or as unanimous in terms of methods and timing as Pappé might suggest. Above all, they were more concerned, Morris claims, with at least appearing to fight cleanly and avoiding civilian casualties than Pappé argues was the case. From Pappé’s point of view there was a gap between the language used by the Zionists and their actions. Morris seems, by contrast, to take what was written and said at face value.

There were good reasons however for the Zionist leadership to exercise caution at the end of 1947 and beginning of 1948. Not only was unity an issue, the memory of Nazi atrocities was all too vivid and the idea of aping them repugnant for many, the response of the British was crucial.

If the Zionist leadership went all out too quickly British public opinion might turn against them and the government, which was ultimately responsible, forced to act. There were also uncertainties about American opinion.

The UN resolution of November 1947 is often regarded as acknowledging Israel but it didn’t in fact do so and the Zionist leadership was keenly aware of this fact.

In addition, and of no inconsiderable significance, showing all one’s cards at once would have been folly: the Palestinians were caught by surprise and didn’t resist. Had they known the horror that was awaiting them they might well have done so. This is the reason why orders were initially issued to avoid massacres. The discipline of the Zionist forces however often left much to be desired.

Ultimately Morris is caught up in his own contradictions. Having ascertained, correctly, that the Arab forces were weak and disorganised, he has a hard time convincing us that the Zionist forces were engaged in a “life and death struggle” or that their horrific actions were “retaliations”. Pappé’s account is more credible for the simple reason that it is logical.

The Palestinian response to the outbreak of violence was frequently to make peace with Jews at local level. This proved ultimately disastrous because the Palestinians often turned away irregulars who might otherwise have been able to defend them. Not a few asked for Jewish help and not a few capitulated to Jewish authority. This did not prevent their eradication; Deir Yassin is a classic example of this phenomenon.

The Zionists, as Pappé rightly pointed out, might have had serious disagreements within their ranks, but were centrally organised and directed. The Palestinians on the other hand sincerely believed that peace was possible and actively sought it. The attacks cannot have been merely retaliatory; there was a method to the madness.

The breakdown in trust was not due to “ill-conceived Jewish military actions” and “over-reactions” as Morris asserts, and the fighting did not simply “spread” but rather the concerted and carefully prepared plan of expulsions was the real cause for the violence.

According to Morris: “The hostilities of December 1947 to March 1948 triggered the start of the exodus of Palestine’s Arabs”. In his version of events the breakdown of law and order and the Jewish “retaliations” were the reasons for the exodus: “Most of the Arab movement out of Haifa’s border areas was due to the fighting, “sniping, bombings and demolitions” and fear of fighting...”

“Mandate sources, according to Ben-Gurion, estimated that by mid-December ‘15,000-20,000’ Arabs had fled from Haifa ... Businesses were closing down, and Arab shopkeepers were selling their stock to Jews at 25% reductions in order to close up quickly. By the 22nd of January, according to Haganah intelligence, some 20,000 Arabs had left Haifa...”

Pappé’s account of the attack on Haifa is both fuller and more plausible: “The early terrorisation of the city’s Arab population the previous December had prompted many among the elite to leave for their residences in Lebanon and Egypt until calm returned to their city. It is hard to estimate how many fell within this category: most historians put the figure at around 15,000 to 20,000 ... The departure of the affluent meant that between 55,000 and 60,000 Palestinians in Haifa were leaderless and, given the relatively small number of armed Arab volunteers in the town, at the mercy of the Jewish forces in April 1948. This is despite the presence of British troops in the city, who were theoretically responsible for the locals’ safety and well-being ... The Jews wanted the port city but without the 75,000 Palestinians who lived there, and, in April 1948, they achieved their objective.”

Unlike Morris, Pappé goes into some detail about how, exactly, this was achieved. Mordechai Maklef, the operation officer of the Carmeli Brigade told his troops: “Kill any Arab you encounter; torch all inflammable objects and force doors open with explosives.”

Pappé relates how: “When these orders were executed promptly within the 1.5 square kilometers where thousands of Haifa’s defenseless Palestinians were still residing, the shock and terror were such that, without packing any of their belongings or even knowing what they were doing, people began leaving en masse. In panic they headed toward the port...”

Once at the port however the defenseless Palestinians were still unable to escape butchery. Once the Carmeli Brigade started firing: “Men stepped on their friends and women on their own children. The boats in the port were soon filled with living cargo. The overcrowding in them was horrible. Many turned over and sank with all their passengers.”

Morris’ errors and omissions are odd, to say the least. His statement: “There is no evidence that the architects of, and commanders involved in, the offensive of the 21st-22nd of April hoped that it would lead to an Arab evacuation of Haifa,” is hard to take seriously.

Morris not only quotes the order issued by Maklef but also quotes a British account: “...during the morning they (i.e. the Haganah) were continually shooting down on all Arabs who moved in Wadi Nisnas and the Old City. This included completely indiscriminate and revolting machinegun fire and sniping on women and children ... attempting to get out of Haifa through the gates into the docks ... There was considerable congestion outside the East Gate (of the port) of hysterical and terrified Arab women and children and old people on whom the Jews opened up mercilessly with fire.” Given the active complicity of the British in the killing, this is quite a statement.