Gaza and the Language of Genocide I #1
Of R2P
Gaza and the Language of Genocide I #1
Of R2P
One example of western “moral norms” (or perhaps more aptly: western hypocrisy and double standards) is the much-vaunted idea of the “responsibility to protect” or R2P enunciated by the UN.
“In 2004, the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, set up by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, endorsed the emerging norm of a responsibility to protect – often called ‘R2P’ – stating that there is a collective international responsibility, ‘exercisable by the Security Council authorising military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing and serious violations of humanitarian law which sovereign governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent. The panel proposed basic criteria that would legitimise the authorisation of the use of force by the UN Security Council, including the seriousness of the threat, the fact that it must be a last resort, and the proportionality of the response.”[1]
In over 70 years however the UN has done nothing to prevent genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing and serious violations of humanitarian law in Palestine so it should hardly surprise that it’s currently doing absolutely nothing now.
It hasn’t even bothered to implement its own resolutions, such as those calling for Palestinian refugees to return to their homes.
Resolution 194 of December 11th 1948 states: “that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible…”
Resolution 242 from November 22nd 1967 calls for the “withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict” and a “just settlement of the refugee problem”. In all these years nothing has happened. The UN hasn’t launched an armed attack on Israel once. Not once.
Nor has the UN done enough to dispel the myth that it created Israel in the first place. As Walid Khalidi pointed out in 1996: “In retrospect, and in the light of half a century of contemplation, what is most striking about the Zionist version of the background, nature, circumstances, and aftermath of the 1947 partition resolution is the extent to which it has become the paradigm or lens through which the entire history of the Palestine problem and the Zionist-Arab conflict prior and subsequent to the resolution itself is viewed and judged. To verify this proposition, one has only to recall how consistently and how often in books, articles, conference papers, editorials, op-eds, readers’ letters, group discussions, or even private conversations relative to the Palestine problem – and nowadays the Middle East peace process – the UN 1947 partition resolution is explicitly or by implication (if only prefatorily) assumed to be the defining moment in which a legal, moral, fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable (albeit with minor blemishes and flaws) ‘compromise’ formula for the resolution of the conflict was accepted by one party in a statesmanlike and accommodating mode and brusquely rejected by the other for reasons difficult to fathom but assumed to be rooted in the arcane realms of religious or cultural atavism.”[2]
Even more damning is his statement: “No, the UN 1947 partition was not the legal, moral, fair, balanced, pragmatic, practicable ‘compromise’ formula that it is made out to be. That it was legal at all is moot. The UNGA altogether failed to address the very serious legal challenges posed by the Arab delegations in the form of draft resolutions submitted to the UNGA meeting to discuss the Palestine problem.”
“The Arab delegations requested that before a decision be taken, the International Court of Justice be asked for its opinion on the following subjects: (a) whether or not Palestine was included in the Arab territories that had been promised independence by Britain at the end of World War I; (b) whether partition was consistent with the objectives and provisions of the Mandate; (c) whether partition was consistent with the principles of the UN Charter; (d) whether its adoption and forcible execution were within the competence or jurisdiction of the UN; and (e) whether it lay within the power of any UN member or group of members to implement partition without the consent of the majority of the people living within the country. The voting on the issue of UN competence to partition Palestine-a combination of (d) and (e)-is particularly instructive. The draft counter resolution that said that the UN did have the authority was carried by only 21 votes to 20 in the Ad Hoc Committee whose total membership was 57.”
“Nor is there much evidence that moral considerations played a significant role in the pro-Zionist votes of the member states or that these were genuinely motivated to alleviate the plight of European Jewry. In the spirit of UN- SCOP’s above-mentioned recommendation of international responsibility for the Jewish plight, the Arab delegations had proposed a draft resolution to the effect that ‘Jewish refugees and displaced persons . . . should be absorbed in the territories of members of the UN in proportion to their area, resources, per capita income, population, and other relevant factors.’ The resolution in the UNGA, again meeting as an ad hoc committee, was not carried. The voting was 16 to 16, with 25 abstentions.”[3]
[1] The Responsibility to Protect UN Published by the Department of Public Information, March 2012
[2] p.1 Revisiting the UNGA Partition Resolution, Walid Khalidi
[3] p.9 Ibid
Welcome back! I missed your input and hope your book is now rolling off the press and on it's way to the binder. Keep us up to date on it's progress. The UN is as much good as a chocolate teapot!