A Letter to Bruce Cain #5
Different Takes on Hamas #2
Dear Bruce,
The question of Hamas is vexing, time-consuming yet the “terrorist” organisation, unfortunately, needs to be dealt with at considerable length.
“Hamas leaders say they waged their Oct. 7 attack on Israel because they believed the Palestinian cause was slipping away,” Ben Hubbard and Maria Abi-Habib recently reported in the New York Times[1] “and that only violence could revive it.”
“Thousands have been killed in Gaza, with entire families wiped out. Israeli airstrikes have reduced Palestinian neighborhoods to expanses of rubble, while doctors treat screaming children in darkened hospitals with no anesthesia. Across the Middle East, fear has spread over the possible outbreak of a broader regional war.”
“But in the bloody arithmetic of Hamas’s leaders, the carnage is not the regrettable outcome of a big miscalculation. Quite the opposite, they say: It is the necessary cost of a great accomplishment — the shattering of the status quo and the opening of a new, more volatile chapter in their fight against Israel.”
“It was necessary to ‘change the entire equation and not just have a clash,’ Khalil al-Hayya, a member of Hamas’s top leadership body, told The New York Times in Doha, Qatar. ‘We succeeded in putting the Palestinian issue back on the table, and now no one in the region is experiencing calm…’”
“‘…I hope that the state of war with Israel will become permanent on all the borders, and that the Arab world will stand with us,” Taher El-Nounou, a Hamas media adviser, told The Times…”
“‘…What could change the equation was a great act, and without a doubt, it was known that the reaction to this great act would be big,’ Mr. al-Hayya said. But, he added, ‘We had to tell people that the Palestinian cause would not die.’”
“A key objective was to take as many Israeli soldiers captive as possible for use in a prisoner swap, according to two Arab officials whose governments talk to Hamas.”
“One regional security official said Hamas had expected that, once the attack began, Palestinians elsewhere would rise up against Israel, other Arab populations would explode against their governments and the group’s regional allies, including Hezbollah, would join the fight.”
“But at least four intelligence services — two Arab and two European — have assessed that Hezbollah had no advance knowledge of the attack, according to officials with access to intelligence reports.”
“Hamas’s own political leaders outside Gaza were also surprised by the assault, according to several Arab and Western officials who track their movements. They have, nonetheless, praised it for reinvigorating the armed struggle against Israel.”
“‘Hamas’s goal is not to run Gaza and to bring it water and electricity and such,’ said Mr. al-Hayya, the politburo member. ‘Hamas, the Qassam and the resistance woke the world up from its deep sleep and showed that this issue must remain on the table.’”
“‘This battle was not because we wanted fuel or laborers,’ he added. ‘It did not seek to improve the situation in Gaza. This battle is to completely overthrow the situation.’”
How seriously should one take all this or, put another way: should one take it seriously at all? In reality it must be denounced for what it is in its entirety: balderdash. The fact that al-Hayya alone is worth c.$4 billion speaks volumes:
“Ismail Haniyeh, 61 holds the position of chairman of the movement and leads the Hamas political bureau, frequently traveling between Istanbul and Doha. In 1989, Haniyeh was detained in Israel for a period of three years, after which he was banished to Marj al-Zohour, located on the Lebanon border, alongside various other leaders from the organization. Subsequently, he made his return to Gaza and was elected to replace Khaled Mashal as the head of the Hamas political bureau. The estimated net worth of Haniyeh is said to be around $4 billion.”
“The 57-year-old Saleh al-Arouri, who holds the second highest position in Hamas, serves as the deputy head of the Hamas political bureau. Additionally, he oversees the actions of the organization's military wing in the West Bank. Currently, he resides in Beirut, Lebanon. In the past, al-Arouri spent 15 years incarcerated in Israeli prisons, after which he was expelled from the country. He participated in negotiations with Israeli representatives to finalize the prison swap to release Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held by Hamas for five years. He was also implicated in the abduction and subsequent killing of three high school students in 2014: Gil-ad Shaar, Naftali Frenkel, and Eyal Yifrach, which prompted a round of fighting with Gaza, lasting 51 days.”
“At the age of 58, Khaled Mashal directs the overseas operations of Hamas, specifically outside of Gaza and the regions of the West Bank. Like Haniyeh, Mashal primarily operates out of Istanbul and Doha. He dedicated about 21 years of his life to serving as the head of Hamas’ political bureau and is also one of its founding members. In a 1997 Mashal narrowly escaped an assassination attempt by Mossad in Jordan. His net worth is estimated to be around $5 billion.”[2]
In 2010 the Mossad killed a top official of Hamas in Dubai. This was by no means an isolated incident.
“Up until the start of the Second Palestinian Intifada,” Ronen Bergman “tells us “in September 2000, when Israel first began to respond to suicide bombings with the daily use of armed drones to perform assassinations, the state had conducted some 500 targeted killing operations. In these, at least 1,000 people were killed, both civilians and combatants. During the Second Intifada, Israel carried out some 1,000 more operations, of which 168 succeeded. Since then, up until the writing of this book, Israel has executed some 800 targeted killing operations, almost all of which were part of the rounds of warfare against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in 2008, 2012, and 2014 or Mossad operations across the Middle East against Palestinian, Syrian, and Iranian targets.”[3]
Why did the Israelis not simply bump off the heads of Hamas, as they had done before, after October the 7th? Why did they start killing women and children instead?
An interesting admission is contained, albeit somewhat disguised, in Bergman’s book. The Israelis killed the second in command of the PLO, Abu Jihad, in 1988, in order to facilitate the rise of Hamas. Of course, as always, this is characterized as a mistake. It was no such thing.
“If the adored and charismatic Abu Jihad had been alive, Hamas might not have been able to consolidate its position and to dominate large parts of the Palestinian public. Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, who was head of AMAN at the time of the assassination, and later chief of the General Staff, said that in an ideal world, ‘if we had known that a short time after Abu Jihad’s elimination, the PLO would take the diplomatic course, then perhaps we would have raided his house and first of all talked with him about his attitudes toward a compromise with Israel, and only then decided whether to kill him or not. In retrospect, his absence is indeed evident to a certain extent. He could have made a significant contribution to the peace process.’”[4]
Similarly, Yasser Arafat was murdered in 2004 because he wanted peace (much as the brilliant novelist Ghassan Kanafani had been in 1972); he was, in addition to that sin of sins, an obstacle to the rise of Hamas. As Norman Finkelstein has repeatedly pointed out: Israel has always feared a “peace offensive” on the part of the Palestinians. This is why moderates rather than radicals have tended to top the Mossad hit-list.
It’s difficult to believe that Hamas is “continuing the resistance” because of its ineffectiveness in doing so. They’ve been more like flies than lions when attacking Israel. Thus, even after the horrific October 7th attacks Israelis could be observed slipping back into their normal routine, with multiple images of Israelis lying next to the beach or pool, sipping cocktails or digging into a huge meal being posted on social media. Are Israelis terrified? Yes, some certainly. Are Israelis happy about having to murder Palestinian women and children once more? Yes, some of that too. The vast majority seem indifferent while not a few want Bibi in jail.
In 2014 Theodore Postol delivered a lecture[5]: “As can be seen by inspecting the photographs (showing damage in Israel from artillery rocket attacks during November 2012 and July 2014), even when the rockets happen to hit buildings, the damage tends to be quite localized. This does not mean that individuals in the area of the rocket attack would not be injured or killed if they were close enough to the impact site, but it is very clear that the warheads are not of sufficient size to cause casualties or deaths to those who are properly sheltered.”
“In contrast, (photos of Israeli bombing in Gaza) show the results of bomb attacks in Gaza in July 2014. The exact yields of the bombs are uncertain, but it appears they are probably in the 1,000- to 2,000-pound category. In these cases, attempts at sheltering the population might well fail, as few shelters can sustain the level of damage that could be inflicted by such large bombs.”
“So again, this illustrates that the small size of the artillery rocket warheads and the ability to quickly warn populations of these arriving small warheads is an extremely capable defense that works far more effectively than Iron Dome.”
The IDF tells us that “Since Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip in 2005, terrorists have fired more than 11,000 rockets into Israel. Over 5 million Israelis are currently living under threat of rocket attacks.”
“More than half a million Israelis have less than 60 seconds to find shelter after a rocket is launched from Gaza into Israel. Most rockets launched from Gaza into Israel are capable of reaching Israel’s biggest cities, including Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.”
“Rocket fire from Gaza is a constant threat facing Israel’s civilians. In 2011 alone, 630 rockets from Gaza hit Israeli towns. That’s an even higher number than in 2010, when 231 rockets hit Israel.”[6]
Yet, what they fail to mention is that, for all the drama, few Israelis have actually perished due to the rockets:
“B’Tselem’s research indicates that, from June 2004 to 23 July 2014, 26 Israeli civilians (four of them minors) and two foreign nationals were killed in Israel by Palestinian rocket and mortar fire. In addition, five soldiers were killed, three in Israel and two in the Gaza Strip. Another Israeli civilian and three foreign nationals were killed by rocket fire at settlements in the Gaza Strip, before they were evacuated. Palestinian rocket fire also killed at least 11 Palestinians (eight of them minors). One Israeli civilian (a minor in Israel) and one soldier (in the Gaza Strip) were killed by an anti-tank missile fire.”[7]
Similarly, the fact that the Israelis are currently able to occupy Gaza should hardly surprise: Hamas was created to fail.
[1] https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/08/world/middleeast/hamas-israel-gaza-war.html
[2] https://www.ynetnews.com/magazine/article/r1zstci7p
[3] p.xxii Rise and Kill First, Ronen Bergman
[4] p.323 Ibid
[5] https://www.technologyreview.com/2014/07/15/172055/an-explanation-of-the-evidence-of-weaknesses-in-the-iron-dome-defense-system/
[6] https://web.archive.org/web/20140804022213/http://www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-toward-israel/
[7] https://web.archive.org/web/20140910195405/http://www.btselem.org/israeli_civilians/qassam_missiles#data